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In Bogucki v. Mednis,57 defendant-insured moved under this
section to have an action by his insurer for a declaration of noncoverage on his insurance policy joined with two personal injury
actions pending against him. The Supreme Court, Monroe County,
denied the motion, holding that the facts of the accident had
nothing in common with the question of timely notice to the
insurer.
The present tendency is to permit consolidation whenever
possible, irrespective of the diversity of the issues. s For example,
consolidation is allowed where both actions arose from the same
accident, involve substantially the same questions of law or fact
except as to damages, and the same witnesses would testify in
both actions. 59 Despite the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of
suits and mitigating costs and expenses, however, consolidation
will not be allowed where there is no substantially similar question
of law or fact. As in Bogucki, consolidation was denied in Gibbons v. Groat,60 where the only common factor was the similarity
of parties.
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DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(a): Disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses
present at the accident not required for pre-trial hearing.
In Alongis v. City of New York,'61 the Supreme Court, Kings
County, held that a party is not required to furnish the names
and addresses of witnesses to the City in a hearing that is preliminary to the commencement of an action. Although the decision
was based on an interpretation of Section 93d-1.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York and Section 50-h of the
General Municipal Law, an analogy to the CPLR may be drawn.
CPLR 3101(a) allows for the disclosure of names and
addresses of witnesses only where the identity of such witnesses
is "material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action. . . ." Even if it is material and necessary, a further limitation exists. CPLR 3101(c) and (d) respectively make nonattainable the work product of an attorney and, qualifiedly, any
material prepared for litigation unless that material can no longer
be duplicated and withholding it will result in injustice or undue
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1967).
58 Dasheff v. Bath, 25 Misc. 2d 13, 15, 206 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y.
County 1959) (two negligence actions consolidated).
59
Berger v. Long Island R.R., 24 App. Div. 2d 509, 261 N.Y.S.2d 575
(2d Dep't 1965).
6022 App. Div. 2d 996, 254 N.Y.S.2d 843 (3d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
6154 Misc. 2d 771, 283 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).
5 54 Misc. 2d 342, 282
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hardship.6 2 Thus, with respect to CPLR 3101(d), disclosure has
been allowed where the witness was present at the time of the
occurrence, 3 was an active participant, 4 or where there were
disclosure so that a party could
special circumstances 6necessitating
5
substantiate his claim.
Although in the Alongis case the witnesses were present at
the time of the occurrence, the court held that disclosure of the
The court distinguished the cases
names was not required.
allowing disclosure on the ground that they involved examinations
before trial after an action had been commenced, and declared
that it was not prepared to extend disclosure to a preliminary
hearing, particularly where the requirement for the examination
was unilateral, i.e., only the City and not the plaintiff could compel
disclosure. The court then distinguished the instant case from that
of Costello v. City of New York.66 In that case, disclosure w.as
allowed in a preliminary hearing similar to the hearing in the instant
case. The difference noted was that in Costello the names and
addresses of witnesses were not otherwise available, while in the
instant case the names and addresses could easily have been obtained
from the police. In short, there were special circumstances in
Costello and none in the instant case.
An exegesis of the two cases gives the general rule that the
limitations on the privilege of CPLR 3101 (d), e.g., furnishing
the names of witnesses present at the occurrence, will not apply
to a preliminary hearing without the showing of special circumstances. The soundness of applying a different rule to hearings
before commencement and hearings after commencement is, however, questionable. The basic purpose of the preliminary hearing
in cases such as these is to enable the City to obtain information
as to the relative merits of the claim, ultimately with the hope
that there will be an expedient and satisfactory settlement. A
denial of disclosure could very well subvert this goal.
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(1966). It should be noted that it might be possible to circumvent these
privileges by asking for the names and addresses of persons present at the
occurrence, not zcitnesses. Rio v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250

N.Y.S.2d 818 (lst Dep't 1964).
63

Votey v. New York City Transit Auth., 46

N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
64 Id.

Misc. 2d 554, 260

OuMajchrzak v. Hagerty, 49 Misc. 2d 1027, 26S N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1966).
c54 Misc. 2d 885, 283 N.Y.S.2d 673 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1967).

